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AQA A level Philosophy

A-Level · AQAPhilosophy17 โน้ต ใน 4 โฟลเดอร์, 74 KB

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Notes for AQA A level Philosophy (7172), in folders for epistemology, moral philosophy, the metaphysics of God and the metaphysics of mind, with one note per group of related arguments, objections and responses by the named philosophers.

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Epistemology / Defining knowledge

Three kinds of knowledge

Philosophers separate three things that English runs together under the word "know". Acquaintance knowledge is direct familiarity with a person, place or thing, as when someone says they know Paris. Ability knowledge is knowing how to do something, such as swimming or playing a piece of music. Propositional knowledge is knowing that something is the case, for example that water boils at a lower temperature at altitude. Epistemology concentrates on the third kind, because it is the kind that can be true or false and so can be analysed in terms of conditions.

The tripartite view

The traditional analysis says that a subject S knows a proposition p if and only if three conditions are met. S believes p, p is true, and S is justified in believing p. Each condition has a plain motivation. Nobody knows what they do not believe, nobody knows what is false, and a lucky guess, even if it happens to be right, does not count as knowledge. If the analysis is correct the three conditions are individually necessary, so removing any one of them would make knowledge impossible, and jointly sufficient, so a belief that meets all three cannot fail to be knowledge.

Because the analysis claims to give necessary and sufficient conditions, a single counterexample is enough to refute it. A case where all three conditions hold without knowledge shows insufficiency, and a case of knowledge missing one condition shows that the condition is not necessary.

Challenges to necessity

The belief condition is questioned by the case of an unconfident examinee. A student gives the correct date in an exam while feeling sure they are only guessing. Their answer comes from real learning, which looks like knowledge, yet they do not believe their answer. Defenders reply that the student does have a weak belief, or that a hesitant answer is not a knowledge claim.

The justification condition is questioned by cases where someone reliably gets things right without having any grounds they could state. A chicken sexer sorts chicks correctly without being able to say how. If this is knowledge, then justification in the sense of giving reasons cannot be necessary. Young children and animals raise a similar point.

Gettier's counterexamples

In 1963 Edmund Gettier published a three-page paper which argued that the three conditions are not sufficient. In his first case Smith and Jones have applied for a job. Smith has good evidence that Jones will get it and that Jones has ten coins in his pocket, so he justifiably believes that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. In fact Smith gets the job, and Smith himself happens to have ten coins in his pocket. The belief is justified and true, but it is true for reasons Smith knows nothing about.

In the second case Smith has strong evidence that Jones owns a Ford. From this he validly infers that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston, a disjunction he has no evidence about for its second part. Jones does not own a Ford, but Brown is by chance in Barcelona. Smith has a justified true belief which is true only through luck.

Gettier cases show that justification and truth can come apart in a way that leaves a belief true by accident. Linda Zagzebski generalised the point: as long as justification does not guarantee truth, there will be a way for a justified belief to turn out true by luck, so the problem cannot be solved by small repairs to the justification condition alone.

Responses to Gettier

Infallibilism

One response is to strengthen justification until it guarantees truth. A justified belief could then never be false, so a case in which a justified belief is true by luck cannot arise. The cost is that very few of our ordinary beliefs would count as knowledge, since almost no evidence rules out error completely. The view therefore moves towards scepticism.

No false lemmas

A second response adds a fourth condition, that the belief is not inferred from any false belief, giving justified true belief plus no false lemmas. In both of Gettier's cases Smith's reasoning passes through a falsehood, so neither counts as knowledge. The view has trouble with luck that involves no inference. In the fake barn case a person looks at a real barn in a district full of convincing fakes. Their perception is direct and no false premise is involved, yet it seems accidental that they are right.

Reliabilism

A third response replaces justification with the requirement that the belief be produced by a reliable process, one that tends to give true beliefs. This is the view associated with Alvin Goldman. It is externalist, because the subject need not know that the process is reliable, so it fits knowledge in children and animals. It faces the generality problem, which is that the same belief can be described as the product of narrow or broad processes with different reliability. A believer who is reliably right through an unrecognised faculty, such as an unexplained clairvoyant power, also seems not to know, which counts against it.

Virtue epistemology

A fourth response says knowledge is true belief that arises from the exercise of intellectual virtues, stable traits such as careful reasoning and good eyesight. Zagzebski develops a version in which success must be due to the virtue, so luck is excluded. Objectors say the account does not clearly say which traits count, and that it still struggles with the fake barn case, where a virtue is exercised and the truth is nonetheless lucky.

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